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Abstract 
 
This paper examines whether ownership and increased competitive pressure affect food 
retailers’ market power, analysing whether all actors involved in the food supply chain 
deviate  from  the  pricing  behaviour  that  exists  under  perfect  competition.  A  method 
proposed  by  Roeger  (1995)  is  used  to  estimate  price-cost  margins,  relaxing  the 
assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale. The obtained results 
show that foreign investments and consolidation have a positive and significant impact on 
the  market  power  of  food  processors  and  retailers.  Food  processors,  agricultural 
producers and wholesalers have lower price-cost margins than retailers, which suggests 
that these actors price closer to marginal costs being more concerned with maximising 
social welfare or that the former have higher costs than retailers. The results are robust to 
various estimation techniques and specifications. 
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Market Dynamics in Food Supply Chains: 
The impact of globalisation and consolidation on firms’ mark-ups 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The  nature  of  the  food  supply  chain  has  been  substantially  affected  by  the  widespread 
consolidation  and  globalisation  of  retail  and  procurement  markets.  Processors  may 
traditionally have driven food distribution by implementing intensive brand policies and then 
using a network of wholesalers and retailers to sell and distribute goods to consumers, though 
currently retailers have strengthen their position. The balance of power in the food system is 
effectively shifting from processors to global retailers, due to fundamental factors such as 
increased concentration and the development of sophisticated information technology. The 
associated structural changes that are occurring along the food supply chain have  though 
broad  socio-economic  impacts,  as  they  undoubtedly  affect  not  only  consumers,  but  also 
agricultural producers, food processors and wholesalers. 
Global retailers experience economies of scale, lower costs and higher profits, so that a 
competitive  price  cutting  behaviour  as  well  as  improved  efficiency  and  service  can  be 
considered potential benefits. However, there may be cause for concern that consolidation and 
globalisation can facilitate retailers’ ability to exercise market power as buyers and sellers, 
dictating higher prices and less variety for the consumers, and lower prices for food suppliers. 
Agricultural producers are forced to cut margins both from retailers, who directly buy food 
products, and from processors, who intend on sharing the burden raised by retailers’ buying 
power. Processors and retailers impose also separately their mark-ups, increasing profits by 
raising prices under competitive pressures. The rising trend of food prices may further affect 
consumers’  welfare,  increase  government  expenditure  and  limit  economic  growth.  The 
analysis of retailers’ mark-ups has, therefore, received enormous attention in the economic 
literature. 
According  to McKinsey  (2003), the  entry  of  global  retailers has a  positive impact  on 
consumers’ prices, though this is not necessarily the case for all products (e.g. Schwentesius 
and  Gomez,  2002).  Concentration  may  be  associated  with  increased  prices,  whereas  the 
presence of global retailers has dampened the performance of local retailers by introducing 
higher competitive pressures (Durand, 2007). Moreover, various case studies conclude that 
there  may  be  a  strong  relationship  between  the  presence  of  global  retailers  and  the 
performance of food suppliers, though the direction of such a relationship is still an open 
question (e.g. Chavez, 2002; Javorcik et al., 2006). Overall, the conventional wisdom that 
retailers have grown more powerful relative to all other actors involved in the food supply 
chain has not been supported by empirical analyses of their relative profitability (Ailawadi, 
2001). The impact of consolidation and shifts of power on firm performance and market 
structure is not clear a priori, and as a result, there has been considerable debate over the 
appropriate policy treatment towards retailers’ market power. 
Previous research has examined whether ownership and increased competitive pressure 
affect  food  retailers’  market  power,  measuring  firm  performance  either  by  sales  growth, 
labour productivity or total factor productivity. The potential problem of endogeneity related 
to the explanatory variables may though arise in the models used to analyse these effects. For 
instance, unobserved productivity shocks may have an impact both on the input factors and 
the output that can result in biased estimates of total factor productivity. The approaches 
proposed to overcome this problem by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) require the inclusion of exogenous instruments (e.g. investment or material inputs), 
that  are  difficult  to  select;  whereas  the  methods  introduced  by  Berry  et  al.  (1999)  and 
Verboven (2002) require data for prices in order to estimate demand functions. In this paper, 
firm performance is measured as the price-cost margins, that are estimated using a method 
proposed by Roeger (1995), based on which endogeneity problems and data requirements are 
avoided. 2 
To analyse then whether all actors involved in the food supply chain deviate from the 
pricing behaviour that exists under perfect competition, the properties of the primal and dual 
Solow  residuals  are  exploited,  estimating  consistently  firms’  mark-ups  without 
instrumentation. In addition, the nominal values of the input and output variables are used, 
without having to find good deflators, and the assumption of constant returns to scale is 
relaxed following Dobrinsky et al. (2004). The firm-level data are retrieved from the Amadeus 
database, which is compiled by a commercial data provider, Bureau van Dijk, and contains 
actual company account data. The sample consists of 2,910 firms of the food supply chain for 
the case of Greece and data are available for the period 1998-2007. 
The  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  2  documents  and  analyses  the  substantial 
restructuring  of  the  food  market  in  Greece  over  the  last  years,  giving  emphasis  on  the 
increased competitive pressure due to the expansion of global food processors and retailers. 
Section 3 describes the empirical model used in the analysis; whereas Section 4 provides 
details in terms of the firm-level data and their descriptive statistics. The empirical estimates 
are presented in the following section, and Section 6 concludes and outlines some possible 
directions for policy responses and future research. 
 
2. THE FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN IN GREECE 
Food actors operate in an integrated supply chain that is subject to considerable changes. A 
change in one of the different elements of the food supply chain affects inevitably the other 
elements. For instance, performance in the agricultural and retailing sectors as well as new 
trends in consumer preferences can affect food processors. Global changes may also exert 
pressure on all elements of the supply chain, but due to fragmentation, certain actors are more 
affected by shifts in power than others. In this framework, agriculture, food processing and 
retailing have always been of great importance to the Greek economy (Table 1).  
The agricultural sector has experienced an important restructuring over the last few years, 
leading to an increase in average farm sizes. The number of persons employed is relatively 
high, though the sector remains highly fragmented, while the share of farming in gross value 
added is declining. The food industry sector is ranked first in the manufacturing sector, as it 
accounts for about 25% in terms of turnover and total value added. The sector employs about 
22% of the manufacturing labour force and processing firms account for more than 20% of 
total  industrial  firms.  The  food  industry  is  a  rather  competitive  sector,  having  as  key 
characteristics its structure and size. About 200 large firms produce 85% of total output, while 
16,000  small  processors  produce  the  remaining  output.  Global  processing  firms 
(multinationals)  mostly  invest  on  new  production  methods,  new  products  and  logistics; 
whereas smaller firms located in rural areas focus mainly on traditional and biological food 
products. Finally, the retail and wholesale sectors account for a large portion of the economic 
activity relative to other services, as they contribute about 20% to total employment and 16% 
to the value added of the economy. 
Table 1 
Food supply chain 
  Agriculture  Food processing  Wholesale  Retail sale 
  2000  2008  2000  2008  2000  2008  2000  2008 
% of total employment  15.2  10.0  2.5  2.5  5.6  7.3  11.2  11.8 
% of total gross value added  6.0  3.3  2.7  3.3  7.3  9.6  4.8  6.5 
Source: Eurostat. 
In particular, the food retailing sector has been defragmented over the last two decades, as 
global retailers have accelerated the growth of the hypermarkets portion at the expense of 
traditional and specialist retailers. Distinguishing food retailing between chains (firms with 
more than 10 stores) and independents, there are about 3,500 supermarkets in Greece; of 
which 2,325 belong to chains (Figure 1). The percentage of total sales captured by the top five 3 
chains has increased from 11 to 27 and 54% for the years 1993, 1999 and 2005, respectively. 
The number of small independent retailers remains relatively stable, though these retailers 
have been marginalised and act as convenience stores. Restrictive planning regulations that 
limit new hypermarket store openings have also stemmed their decline, though it is argued 
that such regulations have potentially allowed for monopolies to be created. In any case, for a 
market to be considered competitive, the top four firms must maintain less than a 40% market 
share. The food retail sector has clearly exceeded this benchmark. 
Figure 1 
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Source: Panorama of Greek Supermarkets, various years. 
Well-known  multinationals,  such  as  Nestlé,  Coca-Cola,  Vivartia,  Campina  Friesland, 
Pepsico, Cadbury, etc., manufacture in Greece for decades, as major food processors have 
sought  to  expand  their  operations  internationally.  Naturally,  the  Greek  market  follows 
international  trends  in  the  field  of  retailing  as  well.  Multinational  chains  have  already 
established a very strong presence in the Greek market, while concentration has been rather 
high during the last decade. The share of total sales for five chains controlled by foreign 
interests  is  about  45%  (i.e.  Carrefour-Marinopoulos,  AB-Vassilopoulos
1, Makro,  Dia and 
Lidl). The Europe’s largest and the world’s second largest retailer, Carrefour, operates in 
Greece since 1999; whereas four out of the five largest European discount chains are also 
present (i.e. Dia since 1995, Lidl since 1999, Plus since 2006 and Aldi since 2008). 
A sharp increase in the number of mergers and acquisitions has been also observed in the 
retail  sector,  as consolidation  allows for  improved  efficiency  gains  and  lower  investment 
costs, in order to achieve profitability (Table 2). If cost savings from improved efficiency 
passes  on  to  consumers  via  lower  prices,  it  is  likely  that  consumers  benefit  from  the 
restructuring of retailing. However, as already mentioned, the consolidation of food retailing 
has reached such a pitch that it has raised concerns about monopoly conditions. It seems that 
retailers  have  grown  so  powerful  that  they  are  able  to  dictate  prices  and  terms  to  their 
suppliers who, with no alternative, have little choice but to comply. Moreover, consolidation 
is expected to continue due to the resulting efficiency gains and maintenance of profitability, 
while competitive pressure is likely to increase further as the world’s largest retailer, Wal-
Mart, has already established an office in Athens to study the Greek market.  
Overall,  retailers  have  added  new  products  as  well  as  services  (e.g.  ready-meals 
departments,  home  delivery  via  online  or  telephonic  orders,  shop-in-shop  arrangements 
selling electronic equipment or travel agencies, financial services via special credit cards, 
etc.),  and  they  have  built  larger  stores  in  order  to  offer  consumers  ‘one-stop  shopping’ 
convenience for more than 20,000 product lines. At the same time, certain chronic problems 
have been solved, such as the problem of shopping hours, along with the amendments to the 
                                                 
1 Foreign investments coming from Delhaize-Lion. 4 
labour  regime,  which  facilitate  part-time  employment  and  the  optimum  arrangement  of 
working  hours.  Nevertheless,  retailers  have  incurred  significant  procurement,  labour  and 
capital investment costs. 
Table 2 
Mergers and acquisitions in food retailing 
Retailer  Firms acquired 
Carrefour-Marinopoulos  Niki (2000); Continent Hellas (2000); Xynos (2005); OK! (2005) 
AB-Vassilopoulos  Trofo (2000); Ena (2001) 
Veropoulos  Panemporiki (2001); Trofino (2007) 
Massoutis  Mpiska (1999); Alfa-Delta (2001); Maios (2006) 
Atlantic  Galinos/Laoutaris (2001); Arista (2002) 
Arvanitidis  Galaxias (2001); Enosi (2002); Lada (2003) 
Market In  Alimenta Nova (2006) 
Sklavenitis  Papageorgiou (2007) 
Source: IOBE, 2005 & Panorama of Greek Supermarkets, various years. 
Consequently, retailers’ behaviour has been affected by the changing patterns of retail 
competition, leading to their so-called defensive and strategic restructuring (Grosfeld and 
Roland,  1997).  As  their  immediate  survival  can  be  guaranteed  taking  measures  such  as 
reducing costs and scaling down unprofitable stores, the degree of gross job creation and 
destruction may indicate retailers’ defensive restructuring. Their long-run viability can be 
further guaranteed via investment and innovation decisions. Strategic restructuring refers then 
to  new  technology,  new  products  and  services.  In  this  paper,  defensive  restructuring  is 
measured by the real sales variable, that captures the extent to which retailers may have faced 
demand shocks. Having higher real sales, the need for defensive restructuring is presumably 
less stringent, as retailers can keep their position in the market without cutting costs. Strategic 
restructuring is measured by the net investment rate at the firm-level, defined as the growth 
rate in the book value of real intangible assets. The number of stores is also examined, as food 
retailers increase sales by opening new stores. Finally, retailers’ profitability is compared with 
the  one  of  processors,  as it  is  generally  argued  that  retailers’  profits  increase  faster than 
processors’ profits. 
Table 3 presents the level of real sales, the growth rate of investment and the number of 
stores for the top ten retailers, as well as for all retailers included in the sample. Data shows 
that retailers controlled by foreign investors have increased their sales levels, whereas local 
retailers have experienced a lower increase in their sales, with the exception of Massoutis, 
whose  growth  rate  of  sales  appears  to  be the  highest  among  those  reported. In  terms  of 
investments, two retailers controlled by foreign interests (Carrefour-Marinopoulos and Dia) 
have the highest growth rates in 2007, whereas two local retailers (Arvanitidis and Atlantic) 
have experienced a reduction in their investments growth. Nevertheless, all top ten retailers 
have increased the number of their stores reflecting the level of sales growth. 
Concerning  profitability,  it  is  expected  that  the  average  growth  rate  of  profits  in 
concentrated markets (i.e. retailing) will be higher than in less concentrated markets (i.e. food 
processing). However, higher profitability growth may not be due to market power, but to 
lower  costs  as  concentrated  markets  entail  larger,  more  efficient  firms.  Figure  2  further 
indicates that food retailers experience higher growth profitability than their suppliers. Some 
food processors have managed to increase their profits, though even large multinationals such 
as Vivartia and Nestlé have to face a reduction in their profitability over the examined period. 
It  should  be  also  noted  that  factors  such  as  slotting  allowances,  retroactive  discounts, 
exclusive  rights,  promotional  expenses  and  display  fees  compose  a  significant  share  of 
retailers’ profits, supporting the differences in food actors’ profitability. 
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Table 3 
Retailers’ sales, investment and number of stores 
  Sales  Investment growth  Number of stores 
  2003  2007  %’03-‘07  2003  2007  2003  2006  %’03-‘06 
Carrefour-
Marinopoulos
  1,458  1,899  0.30  ..  1.48  162  228  0.41 
AB-Vassilopoulos
  789  1,141  0.45  -0.96  0.01  96  108  0.13 
Sklavenitis  ..  912  ..  ..  ..  36  38  0.06 
Veropoulos  536  647  0.21  -0.05  0.61  131  164  0.25 
Metro
  423  601  0.42  -0.52  -0.01  63  70  0.11 
Atlantic  523  586  0.12  -0.28  -0.68  172  177  0.03 
Massoutis  290  541  0.87  0.60  0.11  88  171  0.94 
Dia
  269  381  0.42  -0.19  1.07  278  395  0.42 
Pente  283  381  0.35  -1.00  ..  85  110  0.29 
Arvanitidis  196  226  0.15  0.56  -1.00  118  125  0.06 
TOTAL  6,288  9,443  0.50  1.23  1.70  2,133  2,449  0.15 
Note: 
 Retailers controlled by foreign interests. 
Source: Amadeus & Panorama of Greek Supermarkets, various years. 
Figure 2 
Food processors’ and retailers’ profitability (Mio € & growth rates) 
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Source: Amadeus. 
In this framework, food prices have increased whereas food expenditure relative to income 
has fallen. The level of price increases varies among products, while the share of disposable 
income devoted to food products fell from 18% to 16.3% from 2003 to 2007. As shown in 
Figure 3, after 2005 producer food prices rise faster than consumer food prices, implying that 
producer price increases are currently fully transmitted to consumer food prices and that they 
are not partially absorbed by the food retail sector through a reduction in profit margins (that 
they have increased). It should be, finally, noted that significant price dispersion is observed 
among food retailers, whereas product quality is heterogeneous. Retailers may also provide 
the same product, service levels though vary considerably.
2 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Food prices are difficult to compare from one retailer to the next, as special discounts, coupons and loyalty 
programs offer price discrimination opportunities. 6 
Figure 3 
Producer and harmonised consumer price indices 
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
CPI PPI
 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
As the changing patterns of retail competition may affect food suppliers’ competition and 
economic welfare, this section builds upon previous empirical research methods and insights 
from  new  industrial  organization  studies  to  analyse  market  dynamics  in  the  food  supply 
chain.
3  In  particular, a  method proposed  by  Roeger  (1995)  for  the  price -cost  margins 
estimation is employed, which is based on Hall’s (1988) method of estimating mark-ups and 
on exploiting the properties of the primal and dual Solow residuals. The difference between 
the  two  residuals  is  essentially  explained  as  a  result  of  imperfect  competition  and  by 
subtracting the two residuals from each other; the unobservable productivity term cancels out 
avoiding the problem of endogeneity. 
The main intuition is that the mark-up term is embodied in the measurement of total factor 
productivity growth, which is the output growth not accounted for by the growth in input 
factors. Using this method, the price-cost margins can be estimated consistently avoiding 
potential correlations between the unobserved productivity shocks and the input factors of 
production. Consider a log-linear homogenous production function     ,, it it it it it Q F K L M , for 
output  it Q , where  , it it KL  and  it M  are capital, labour and material inputs, and  it  is a shift 
variable representing changes in productivity efficiency of firm  i at time t (a Hicks neutral 
technological progress). If price exceeds marginal cost, the input shares per unit of output do 
not sum to one, but are lower because of the existence of a mark-up factor. This mark-up as 
well as the technology components can be decomposed from the Solow residuals. 
Based on the aforementioned production function and assuming imperfect competition, the 
primal Solow residual is derived after log-differentiation as follows: 
      11                        Pit it Lit Mit it Lit it Mit it it it it it it SR q k l m q k     (1) 
where     , L M it  is the revenue share of the respective factor and  it  is the Lerner index, which 
is closely related to the price-cost mark-up  it, as  11   it it , assuming constant returns to 
scale. Dobrinsky et al. (2004) further show that in the case of variable returns to scale, the 
Lerner index can be denoted by  1     it it it , where it is the returns to scale index. 
The dual or priced-based Solow residual is derived by a general  cost function associated 
with the production function, assuming that the change in marginal cost is a weighted average 
of changes in input prices  with respect to their relative cost shares, minus the effect of 
technological innovation. That is defined as: 
      11                       Dit Lit Mit it Lit it Mit mit it it it it it it SR r w p p p r    (2) 
                                                 
3 Tybout (2003) provides an overview of the methods used to estimate mark-ups using firm-level data. 7 
where  it r  is the growth rate of the rental price of capital,  it w  is the growth rate of wages, and 
mit p  and  it p  are the growth rates of material prices and output, respectively. 
Subtracting  equation  (2)  from  (1)  and  adding  an  error  term,  it  ,  the  unobservable 
productivity  term    1   it it   cancels  out.  The  following  equation  can  be,  therefore, 
estimated to yield consistent estimates of the price-cost mark-up: 
    it it it it p q r k          
          it Lit it it it it Mit Mit it it it it w l r k p m r k                              (3) 
where the right-hand side is, in fact, the Solow residual measuring all variables in nominal 
terms. 
To estimate equation (3), a simplified version of this expression can be denoted by: 
it i it it it yx                           (4) 
where  it y  can be interpreted as the growth rate in output per value of capital in firm i; and  it x  
as a composite variable that represents the growth rates in the various input factors weighted 
by their respective shares in total output. A white noise error term is also included due to a 
possible mis-measurement of labour input or of the rental price of capital. The average price-
cost margin is captured by  it  , and i  stands for an unobservable firm-level fixed effect that 
captures firm heterogeneity. 
In this framework, sales are used as the output variable, whereas capital is denoted by 
tangible fixed assets and labour input is measured as the number of employees. The rental 
price of capital is calculated using the following equation: 
  it it it I r e p                         (5) 
where  I p  stands for the index of investment goods prices, measured at a country-level
4 ,  it e  is 
the interest paid at a firm-level, and  it   is the depreciation ratio measured at a firm-level as 
well. The industry-specific wage expenditure is used for wages, due to the lack of the wage 
expenditure variable.
5 The variable called cost of goods sold is also used for the m aterial 
inputs. Following Levinsohn (1993), it is further assumed that the mark-ups are the same for 
all firms within the same sector.  The estimation of a separate mark -up for each firm is not 
possible, as there would not be available enough degrees of freedom. Deflation of variables 
using price indices is no longer needed; whereas the use of company account data implies that 
the financial flows associated with individual food products cannot be  traced, though food 
actors may be multi-product firms. It is, therefore, assumed that if a firm has market power 
over one of its products, it is likely to have market power over its other products as well. 
Alternatively, the estimates of mark-ups can be reviewed as an average firm effect, assessing 
whether global food actors affect the average market power of  the different elements in the 
supply chain. 
Consequently, the estimated mark -ups  will  reflect competitive pressures in the food 
market, though increased competition may partially stem from conduct  rules imposed by 
policy makers  and other sources such as foreign direct investments (FDI) and  consumer 
preferences. If global retailers achieve cost savings without reducing food prices, this would 
result in a higher price -cost margin. The relative performance of the foo d actors will be, 
therefore, examined as a function of the ownership structure, where performance is measured 
as the firms’ price-cost margin. The effect of increased competitive pressure on market power 
will also be examined, as the pricing behaviour of firms is affected. According to Sutton 
(1991), a negative relationship exists between the number of firms in an industry and the 
price-cost margin, there is though evidence that concentration can be positively related to 
mark-ups (Domowitz, et al., 1988). The following model is effectively estimated: 
                                                 
4 From the AMECO database, European Commission. 
5 From the STAN database, OECD. 8 
  it i it it it it jt it jt t it y x x FDI x H b FDI b H b d u                    1 2 3 1 2 3        (6) 
where the dependent variable represents the difference between the Solow residuals;  it FDI  is a 
dummy equal to one if the firm is owned for more than 10% by foreign shareholders in year t; 
and  jt H  stands for the three digit Herfindahl index of concentration in sector j in year t. The 
coefficients  2 and  3 refer to changes in price-cost margins associated with globalisation 
and competition pressure, so that for instance the total mark-up of global food actors is equal 
to    12 . The ownership and competition variables are also included separately to capture 
any difference between the primal and dual Solow residuals that is not explained by market 
power. A white noise error term is, finally, included as above, as well as year dummies,  t d , to 
control for common aggregate shocks. Equation (6) is estimated using OLS and fixed effects 
estimators. Random effects were also estimated, though, the Hausman test rejected this model 
in favour of the fixed effect model.
6 The latter may then capture any unobserved firm-level 
heterogeneity and measurement error that is constant over time. 
 
4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The firm-level data used in this paper are retrieved from the Amadeus database that consists 
of  company  accounts  reported  to  national  statistical  offices  for  European  firms  in  35 
countries. This dataset essentially contains firms’ balance sheets, the profit and loss accounts, 
and  information  on  stocks,  shareholders,  subsidiaries  and  activities.  Table  4  presents  the 
summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical estimations for each element of the 
food supply chain. After deleting firms with missing information, the full sample includes the 
unbalanced panel data on 2,910 firms for the period 1998 to 2007. In particular, the sample is 
composed  of  199  agricultural  firms,  1,361  food  and  beverage  processing  firms,  1,113 
wholesalers of food products and 237 food retailers.
7 
The majority of the firms were established after 1990, although the dates of establishment 
for the overall sample range between  1915  and  2006. In terms of  firm size,  small firms 
comprise the clear majority of the sample (about 46 %), with an almost equal proportion of 
medium firms along the various elements of the supply chain (8 %). The retail sector has the 
highest shares of large and very large firms (10 and 12 %, respectively), whereas there are no 
wholesalers with more than 250 employees. Concerning foreign investments, it should be 
noted that about 74 % of these originate from other EU countries, and 11 % of the reported 
investments are from the United States. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom are the first 
two European countries from where foreign investments originate, followed by France . 
Switzerland appears to have the majority of the investments in the sample for countries of the 
rest of the world. Moreover, the average Herfindahl index in 1998 is 0.242 in the processing 
sector, and in 2007, it appears to be reduced at a rate of  0.116. This compares to an average 
Herfindahl index of  0.363 and 0.079  for the  agricultural and  wholesale sectors  over the 
examined period. The retailing sector though is becoming more competitive over time, with 
an exception of the last two years, whereas the average index is much higher than for the rest 
of the food actors (0.868). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 An F-test indicated that fixed effects were significant in all specifications. 
7 Wholesale of agricultural raw materials, live animals, food, beverages and tobacco; Retail sale in non-specialised 
stores with food, beverages or tobacco predominating and retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in specialised 
stores. 9 
Table 4 
Summary statistics 
  Mean  Std Dev  Min  Max  No.Obs. 
  Agricultural firms 
Sales  5,857  12,420  51  141,069  1,520 
Tangible fixed assets  2,531  5,008  37  65,669  1,509 
Employment  44  122  1  1,070  1,508 
Material cost  4,891  10,807  41  129,453  1,450 
Herfindahl index  0.363  0.118  0.233  0.695  1,520 
Years of operation  17  13  1  84  1,520 
  Food processing 
Sales  8,004  31,012  56  686,600  10,634 
Tangible fixed assets  3,017  11,262  48  342,621  10,612 
Employment  50  137  1  2,850  10,564 
Material cost  5,336  18,643  53  336,316  10,015 
Herfindahl index  0.151  0.039  0.114  0.242  10,634 
Years of operation  15  12  1  92  10,634 
  Wholesale 
Sales  6,618  15,281  63  281,006  7,746 
Tangible fixed assets  669  2,037  34  37,133  7,551 
Employment  14  22  1  232  7,680 
Material cost  5,334  12,093  58  217,063  7,534 
Herfindahl index  0.079  0.017  0.059  0.118  7,746 
Years of operation  14  9  1  81  7,746 
  Retail sale 
Sales  30,797  130,503  157  1,899,111  1,701 
Tangible fixed assets  6,734  42,238  40  729,342  1,687 
Employment  193  815  1  11,500  1,698 
Material cost  22,499  93,532  72  1,349,756  1,692 
Herfindahl index  0.868  0.966  0.731  0.989  1,701 
Years of operation  14  8  1  67  1,701 
Note: Values are expressed in thousands of €. 
It  should  be,  finally,  noted  that  the  sample  contains  a  significant  share  of  the  entire 
population of medium and large firms in the Greek food supply chain over the period 1998-
2007. In particular, the firm-level data for the food processing sector account on average for 
about 85 % of the total employment and 77 % of total gross turnover as compared to the 
aggregated data retrieved from Eurostat. The data cover also most of the total employment 
and turnover in the retail sector (54 % and 45 %, respectively). In terms of the wholesale and 
agricultural sectors, these shares appear to be lower as expected, due to the fact  that the 
majority  of  firms  operating  in  the  local  market  are  not  obliged  to  publish  account  data. 
Nevertheless, the Amadeus data are quite representative as 33 % and 11 % of total turnover is 
covered in the wholesale and agricultural sectors. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In Table 5, the results of equation’s (4) estimation are presented. The average market power is 
reported for the entire food supply chain and for each actor separately. The average market 
power in the food supply chain, with an estimated Lerner index of 10.1 %, is much higher 
than the estimated market power of 3.8 % obtained when assuming variable returns to scale.
8 
In any case, as the Lerner index is bounded between 0 and 1 with lower values representing a 
higher degree of competition,  food retailers appear to have a rather high market power in 
comparison to the other actors of the supply chain . The regression results also show that 
imperfect competition explains more than 95 percent of the difference between the primal and 
dual productivity measures with significant mark -ups for all elements of the food supply 
                                                 
8 The average returns to scale are computed at the three digit sector-level from the production function. 10 
chain. The generally excellent fit of these equations suggest then that imperfect competition 
might be the cause of this discrepancy. 
The estimated mark-ups are also reported year by year to trace their evolution over time. 
The panel estimation results are similar to those obtained for a single-year estimation. The 
estimated mark-up ratios though range from 1.01 in 2001 to 1.28 in 2003 for the case of 
retailing.  Using  price-cost  margins  as  a  measure  of  market  power,  it  is  obvious  that 
competition has increased significantly more in the retailing sector. This becomes evident by 
comparing columns (2) to (5). The results further indicate that the firms’ mark-ups based on 
single  year  estimates  tend  to  display  some  time  variability,  which  may  be  attributed  to 
cyclical factors or to a changing level of competitive pressure within the sectors. 
Overall, the results support the general view that prices exceed marginal cost in food 
retailing more than in food processing, whereas there is no perfect competition in any of the 
sectors of the food supply chain. The estimates also suggest substantially lower mark-ups for 
agricultural producers and wholesalers. Another interesting result concerns the magnitude of 
the mark-up ratios in the regressions over time. All actors apart from retailers appear then to 
price closer to marginal costs being more concerned with maximising social welfare. An 
alternative interpretation may be that the food suppliers and wholesalers have higher costs 
than retailers. 
Table 5 
Firms’ mark-ups 
  Food Supply 
Chain 
(1) 
Agricultural 
firms 
(2) 
Food 
processing 
(3) 
 
Wholesale 
(4) 
 
Retail Sale 
(5) 
VRS    0.038  0.047  0.128  0.122  0.202 
CRS    0.101  0.003  0.102  0.095  0.169 
   1.112 
(0.003) 
0.997 
(0.015) 
1.113 
(0.005) 
1.105 
(0.005) 
1.203 
(0.007) 
2 R   0.863  0.774  0.834  0.872  0.950 
No.Obs.  19,084  1,369  9,574  6,650  1,491 
1999  1.185 
(0.010) 
1.120 
(0.031) 
1.163 
(0.019) 
1.194 
(0.013) 
1.218 
(0.014) 
2000   1.104 
(0.011) 
0.840 
(0.065) 
1.074 
(0.017) 
1.135 
(0.016) 
1.195 
(0.017) 
2001  1.048 
(0.012) 
1.087 
(0.049) 
1.154 
(0.016) 
0.984 
(0.021) 
1.007 
(0.041) 
2002  1.126 
(0.009) 
0.959 
(0.038) 
1.138 
(0.014) 
1.115 
(0.015) 
1.236 
(0.046) 
2003  1.117 
(0.010) 
1.012 
(0.045) 
1.036 
(0.016) 
1.151 
(0.015) 
1.277 
(0.015) 
2004   1.139 
(0.009) 
1.117 
(0.042) 
1.185 
(0.013) 
1.122 
(0.015) 
1.128 
(0.032) 
2005   1.106 
(0.009) 
0.937 
(0.043) 
1.217 
(0.014) 
1.087 
(0.015) 
1.263 
(0.012) 
2006   1.079 
(0.009) 
0.881 
(0.041) 
1.112 
(0.015) 
1.058 
(0.015) 
1.265 
(0.017) 
2007   1.076 
(0.009) 
0.985 
(0.042) 
0.963 
(0.016) 
1.113 
(0.013) 
1.259 
(0.010) 
Values in the parentheses are standard errors. All estimations are statistically significant 
at 0.01. 
Concerning  the  impact  of  globalisation  and  competitive  pressure  on  market  power,  it 
appears in Table 6 that the estimate of the mark-up ratio for the entire food supply chain is 
about the same estimate. In the second column, the average mark-up is estimated at 1.10. 
However, the price-cost margin varies with the level of foreign interest and concentration in 
the various sectors. Sectors with higher Herfindahl index of concentration are characterised 
by high market power, as expected. For instance, the coefficient of 0.29 for the retail sector 11 
suggests that a reduction in product market concentration of a percentage point is equivalent 
to a reduction in the average price-cost margin of 2.9 percentage points. It is also indicated 
that domestically owned firms have lower price-cost margins relative to foreign-owned firms, 
captured by  2. The point estimate of 0.013 for the processing sector  suggests that foreign 
ownership is associated with an average price-cost margin of 1.076. Consequently, foreign-
owned firms have better performance measured in terms of their price-cost margins, as they 
are better in cutting costs relative to domestic firms.  Moreover, the fixed effects estimations 
suggest that sales are positively and significantly related to  globalisation, though  market 
concentration does not have a significant impact. 
Table 6 
Empirical Results 
  Food supply chain  Agricultural 
firms 
Food 
processing  Wholesale  Retail sale 
  OLS  Fixed-
effects  Fixed-effects 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1  1.087 
(0.006)*** 
1.101 
(0.006)*** 
0.742 
(0.066)*** 
1.063 
(0.023)*** 
0.976 
(0.029)*** 
0.947 
(0.066)*** 
2   0.013 
(0.004)*** 
0.012 
(0.004)***   0.013 
(0.005)***    0.007 
(0.007) 
3   0.138 
(0.014)*** 
0.110 
(0.015)*** 
0.758 
(0.185)*** 
0.362 
(0.147)** 
1.719 
(0.371)*** 
0.288 
(0.076)*** 
FDI  -0.004 
(0.003) 
0.171 
(0.090)*    0.179 
(0.097)*    0.103 
(0.269) 
Herfindahl 
index 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.009 
(0.015) 
0.144 
(0.163) 
-0.121 
(0.212) 
0.763 
(0.613) 
0.449 
(0.519) 
Constant  0.074 
(0.022)*** 
0.063 
(0.057) 
-0.617 
(0.800) 
0.287 
(0.439) 
-0.697 
(0.615) 
-3.358 
(3.977) 
R
2  0.863  0.825  0.776  0.790  0.873  0.943 
No.Obs.  11,065  11,065  1,369  9,574  6,650  1,491 
Values  in  the  parentheses  are  standard  errors.  Significance  levels:  0.01***,  0.05**,  0.1*.  Year 
dummies were also included in the estimations. 
Taking into account the possibility of measurement errors in the input factors, concern 
arises related to the potential endogeneity of  it x   in equation (6). The general methods of 
moments estimator (GMM), proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), is therefore employed to 
account  for  this  problem  estimating  equation  (6)  with  instrumental  variables.  All  lagged 
values of  it x   starting from t-2 and before are used as instruments and estimation is made in 
first differences to control for unobserved fixed effects. Table 7 shows the results obtained for 
this case. The estimated coefficients are quite different compared to those already reported, 
though  a  significant  increase  in  mark-ups  is  still  found  due  to  globalisation,  and 
concentration. The Sargan test confirms the instrument validity in all cases and the second 
order serial correlation test does not reject the model. 
To further control for any dynamics in the mark-ups, an alternative approach to measuring 
market power is used following Tybout (2003). The so-called observed firm-level price-cost 
margin (PCM) is defined as sales net of expenditures on labour and materials over sales. That 
is: 


it it Lit it Mit it
it
it it
P Q P L P M
PCM
PQ
                 (7) 
so that the following equation can be estimated: 
                 1 1 2 3 4 5 it i it it it it it jt t it PCM PCM K P Q FDI H d          (8) 
where   i  is the unobserved firm-level fixed effect and  it  is a white noise error term. The 
lagged dependent variable is included to control for the possibility that price-cost margins are 12 
mean-reverting. As additional controls, the capital to sales ratio is included, as well as the 
globalisation and concentration variables and the year dummies. Equation (8) is estimated in 
first differences using GMM as in the previous case. The results are shown in columns (6) to 
(10) of Table 7. The point estimates suggest that the firm-level PCM is on average 11.1 
percentage points higher due to globalisation, whereas concentration affects also positively 
the firm-level PCM for the overall case of the food supply chain. Similar conclusions can be 
derived when examining separately all elements of the supply chain, though both factors 
appear to have a larger impact for the case of food processing. These provide then evidence of 
a positive effect on firm mark-ups due to globalisation and consolidation, irrespectively of the 
method used. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The industrialisation of agriculture, the globalisation of food processing and distribution as 
well as the continued consolidation of the retailing sector are all connected. An important 
factor  to  address the  socio-economic  problems  in  the  food system  is to  understand  these 
supply  chain  dynamics.  For  instance,  the  buying  power  of  retailers  may  have  adverse 
economic effects on the viability and efficiency of food suppliers, whereas such power may 
go hand in hand with increased selling power and thus potentially have adverse effects on 
consumer welfare. As competition may be considerably distorted, Roeger’s (1995) method 
was used in this paper that allows to derive an expression for the difference between the 
primal and dual productivity measures under imperfect competition, to estimate firms’ mark-
ups in the food supply chain. Firm-level data were used for a period of ten years for actors 
involved in the Greek food supply chain to estimate price-cost margins and to analyse how 
these are affected by foreign ownership and increased competitive pressure. 
The food retail sector is the most dynamic one in Greece, as it is rapidly changing with the 
emergence  of  global  retailers  and  mergers  of  existing  firms.  It  is  in  fact  increasingly 
concentrated, offering opportunities for firms to exert market power on both the output and 
input markets. The obtained results show that the concentration of food retailers increases 
firms’ profits, and the retailing sector has become relatively more profitable and powerful 
than the food processing sector. Moreover, processors, agricultural producers and wholesalers 
have  lower  price-cost  margins  than  retailers.  To  check  the  robustness  of  the  results,  the 
importance  of  correcting  mark-up  estimates  by  the  returns  to  scale  factor  was  also 
highlighted, as the measurement bias induced by the assumption of constant returns to scale 
was  also  taken  into  consideration.  Firms’  mark-ups  were  further  examined  using  GMM 
estimators and the observed firm-level PCM. The results are robust to various estimation 
techniques  and  specifications  that  control  for  firm-specific  attributes  inherent  to  the  food 
supply chain. 
As  far  as  the  policy  implications  are  concerned,  the  results  of  the  analysis  point  that 
increased concentration in food retailing has resulted in food prices increases, as retailers get 
their products at lower prices but they do not pass those cost savings on to consumers. If 
consolidation is then allowed to continue further, food prices are likely to increase in the long-
term because competition among top retailers will decrease. Appropriate policies should be 
developed  ensuring  that  retailers  do  not  exchange  price  information,  while  tackling  anti-
competitive behaviour of individual dominant actors involved in the food supply chain. For 
example, regulations concerning planning and zoning restrictions, shop opening hours and 
retail pricing policy might affect the increasing power of retailers. 
In this paper, the impact of foreign investors’ expansion in the Greek food supply chain 
was considered in the sense that a mark-up increase is likely to reflect an increase in food 
prices affecting negatively consumer welfare. The impact of globalisation and consolidation 
on employment and wages could also be empirically analysed. This is open to future research. 
 13 
Table 7 
Empirical Results 
  Food supply 
chain 
Agricultural 
firms 
Food 
processing  Wholesale  Retail  
sale    Food supply 
chain 
Agricultural 
firms 
Food 
processing  Wholesale  Retail  
sale 
  GMM    PCM-GMM 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)    (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
1  0.943 
(0.032)*** 
0.392 
(0.089)*** 
1.133 
(0.058)*** 
1.111 
(0.059)*** 
0.990 
(0.024)***  1  0.235 
(0.027)*** 
0.291 
(0.015)*** 
0.245 
(0.028)*** 
0.364 
(0.018)*** 
0.010 
(0.003)*** 
2   0.331 
(0.088)**    0.061 
(0.058)    0.168 
(0.119)   2   -0.039 
(0.009)*** 
-0.019 
(0.004)*** 
-0.033 
(0.009)*** 
-0.020 
(0.004)*** 
-0.120 
(0.001)*** 
3   0.502 
(0.131)*** 
1.436 
(0.255)*** 
-0.365 
(0.437) 
0.095 
(0.732) 
0.227 
(0.028)***   3   0.111 
(0.048)**    0.105 
(0.049)**    0.016 
(0.013) 
1 b   -0.083 
(0.038)**    0.107 
(0.046)**    -0.020 
(0.019)   4   0.027 
(0.008)*** 
0.006 
(0.003)** 
0.028 
(0.012)** 
0.049 
(0.017)*** 
-0.017 
(0.004)*** 
2 b   -0.031 
(0.018)* 
-0.215 
(0.056)*** 
-0.888 
(0.297)*** 
2.217 
(0.880)** 
0.029 
(0.009)***             
Constant  0.046 
(0.045) 
0.651 
(0.158)*** 
1.444 
(0.492)*** 
-1.949 
(0.779)** 
-0.225 
(0.076)***  Constant  0.057 
(0.026)** 
0.093 
(0.009)*** 
0.076 
(0.029)*** 
0.059 
(0.017)*** 
0.294 
(0.029)*** 
Sargan test  0.055  0.060  0.141  0.324  0.154  Sargan 
test  0.094  0.372  0.075  0.168  0.177 
Autocorre-
lation test  0.150  0.262  0.289  0.739  0.054  Autocorre
-lation test  0.259  0.548  0.212  0.763  0.765 
No.Obs.  9,465  1,167  8,209  5,560  1,256  No.Obs.  10,707  1,311  9,249  6,600  1,458 
Values in the parentheses are standard errors. Significance levels: 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.1*. Year dummies (not reported in this table) were also included in the estimations. 14 
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